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EXCLUSIONARY PRICING WHEN SCALE MATTERS∗
LILIANE KARLINGER†
MASSIMO MOTTA‡
We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offer-
ing a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able
to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the
network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent’s installed base
guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to
attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price
discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achiev-
able socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications
of this result.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER DEALS WITH THE EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS of price dis-
crimination, which may take different forms. One such form which has recently
received renewed attention is rebates, i.e. discounts applicable where a customer
exceeds a specified target for sales in a defined period.
Under US case law, rebates are generally said to promote competition on the
merits, and the (high) burden of demonstrating their anticompetitive effect is on
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the plaintiff.1 In the EU, instead, the European Commission and the Commu-
nity Courts have systematically imposed large fines on dominant firms applying
different forms of rebates.2 The recent Michelin II judgment3 has established
that not only individualized discounts but also standardized quantity discounts
(that is, rebates given to any buyer whose purchases exceed a predetermined
number of units) are anticompetitive if used by a dominant firm.4 The cases of
explicit and implicit price discrimination we analyze in the paper are meant to
reproduce the main features of individualized and standardized discounts.
In an industry exhibiting network effects, and where both firms can price-
discriminate, we find that an incumbent firm having an established customer
base can exclude a more efficient entrant that does not have a customer base
yet. Under price discrimination, the incumbent might charge less than marginal
costs to some crucial group of consumers (and make up the loss by charging
monopoly price to the remaining buyers), thereby depriving the entrant of the
critical mass of consumers it needs (in our model, network externalities imply
that consumers will want to consume a network product only if demand has
reached a critical threshold). As a result, price discrimination reduces the set of
(socially efficient) achievable entry equilibrium: only very efficient entrants will
be able to sell at equilibrium. We shall also show that the more targeted price
discrimination the higher its exclusionary potential.
To give an example of the type of industry that we have in mind, consider
the Microsoft Licensing Case.5 Microsoft marketed its PC operating systems
(Windows and MS-DOS) primarily through original equipment manufacturers
(‘OEMs’), which manufacture PCs. When discussing the substantial barriers
to entry for potential rivals of Microsoft, the Complaint explicitly mentioned
‘the difficulty in convincing OEMs to offer and promote a non-Microsoft PC
operating system, particularly one with a small installed base’.
The US Department of Justice alleged that Microsoft designed its pricing
policy to deter OEMs from entering into licensing agreements with competing
operating system providers, thereby reinforcing the entry barriers raised by the
network effects that are inherent in this industry.
Although it deals with pricing schemes rather than contracts, our paper is
closely related to the literature on anticompetitive exclusive dealing. Segal and
Whinston [2000] is probably the closest work to ours.6 Building on Rasmusen et
al. [1991], they show the exclusionary potential of exclusive contracts when the
incumbent can discriminate on the compensatory offers it makes to buyers. Our
study differs from theirs in several respects: (i) in their game the incumbent has
a (first-mover) strategic advantage in that it is allowed to contract with buyers
before entry occurs; (ii) if buyers accept the exclusivity offer of the incumbent,
they commit to it and cannot renegotiate it even if entry occurs; (iii) buyers are
symmetric and only linear pricing is considered. In our paper, instead, (i) the
incumbent and the entrant choose price schedules simultaneously, (ii) buyers
simply observe prices and decide which firm to buy from (therefore avoiding
any problems related to assumptions on commitment and renegotiation); (iii)
we explore the role of rebates and quantity discounts in a world where buyers
differ in size. Yet, the mechanisms which lead to exclusion in the two papers are
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very similar: both papers present issues of buyers’ miscoordination, and scale
economies which are created by fixed costs in their model are created instead
by network effects in ours.
Our paper is also related to the literature on divide-and-conquer strategies, in
particular to Innes and Sexton [1993, 1994] and Segal [2003]. A major innovation
of our work relative to theirs is that we allow the entrant to use the same
discriminatory tools available to the incumbent.7
Armstrong and Vickers [1993] consider a situation where the incumbent has
an uncontested turf (the ‘sheltered segment ’) and faces an entrant on a ‘com-
petitive segment ’. They show that allowing the incumbent to price discriminate
across these two segments will negatively affect entry. In our model, one can
think of the installed base as the incumbent’s sheltered segment, and of the
new buyers as the competitive segment. However, in our setup, the buyers who
bought in the past (i.e. those who constitute the installed base) do not buy
again when the market opens for the new buyers. Therefore, there is no scope
for exclusion through discrimination between old and new consumers. The ex-
clusionary mechanism we study in our paper is based on price discrimination
among different buyers within the competitive segment, rather than discrimina-
tion between the competitive and the sheltered segment. What makes it so hard
for the entrant to prevail over the incumbent is the fact that the incumbent can
break many entry equilibria by offering prices below cost to some of these new
buyers, and recouping instantaneously all losses on the remaining buyers, whose
demand is insufficient for the entrant to reach the critical size.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on incompatible entry in net-
work industries. The very nature of network effects provides a strong incum-
bency advantage, shielding dominant firms against competitors even in the ab-
sence of any anticompetitive conduct (Farrell and Klemperer [2006]). Crémer
et al. [2000] show that an incumbent can strategically use compatibility deci-
sions so as to deter entry.8 More closely related to our paper, Jullien [2001]
studies how an entrant can use divide-and-conquer strategies to induce buyers
to coordinate on the entrant instead of the incumbent.
II. THE SETUP
Consider an industry composed of two firms, the incumbent I, and an entrant
E. The incumbent supplies a network good, and has an installed consumer
base of size βI > 0. (The network good is durable: ‘old’ buyers will continue
to consume it but no longer need to buy it.) I incurs constant marginal cost
cI ∈ (0, 1) for each unit it produces of the network good.
The entrant can supply a competing network good at marginal cost cE ∈
[0, 1), with cE < cI , i.e. it is more cost-efficient than the incumbent. Since it
has not been active in the market so far, it has installed base βE = 0. To focus
on the role of network externalities, we assume away any fixed costs of entry.
The good can be sold to m different ‘new’ buyers, indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m.
The buyers may differ in their (price-inelastic) demands: With total market
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size normalized to 1, denote buyer i’s share in total demand by si, where s1 ≤
s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sm and
∑
i si = 1. Buyers cannot resell the good among each
other, nor can they make side payments of any kind to each other. Whenever a
buyer is indifferent between the two suppliers, we assume that it will source its
requirements from one supplier only (i.e. it will not split orders among them).9
Define supplier k’s network size Qk as the firm’s installed base plus its total
sales to all ‘new’ buyers:
Qk = βk + s
k
1 + . . .+ s
k
m
where k identifies the seller, k = I,E, and ski = si if buyer i sources from
supplier k, and zero otherwise. Note that our definition of k’s network size,
Qk, implies that only units which are actually consumed count towards firm k’s
network size. Thus, we rule out the possibility of supplier k artificially inflating
its network size by selling (or giving away) some arbitrarily large quantity Q to
a buyer i whose consumption potential is only si < Q.
Buyers exert positive consumption externalities on each other: If firm k’s
network size Qk is below a certain threshold level s¯, consumption of k’s good
gives zero value to its buyer. The goods produced by the two firms are incom-
patible, so that buyers of firm k do not exert network externalities on buyers
of the rival network. Let the buyers’ willingness to pay for a network good of
sufficient size be p¯ (Qk) = 1 if Qk ≥ s¯, and zero otherwise. Thus, if both firms
manage to reach the minimum size s¯, then consumers will consider I’s and E’s
networks as being of homogenous quality, even if sI = sE.
The assumption that a buyer’s utility from consuming is positive only if
the network in question reaches the threshold size s¯ is designed to capture in an
admittedly simple way the presence of network effects.10 We make the following
assumptions on the threshold size:
(i) βI ≥ s¯: the incumbent has already reached the critical size with its sales to
the ‘old’ buyers, while the entrant will have to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to
reach s¯;
(ii) sm < s¯ , so that winning only one buyer’s orders (even if it is the largest
buyer) will not be sufficient for the entrant to reach the minimum network size;
(iii) s¯ ≤ 1, so that the entrant will reach the minimum size for sure if it sells to
all m new buyers.
These assumptions allow us to characterize the unique socially efficient al-
location: Since the new generation of buyers is in itself sufficient to generate a
network of size s¯, and such a network gives the same utility as one that com-
prises both the old and the new generation, and since moreover the entrant is
more cost-efficient (cE < cI), the social planner would want the entrant (and
not the incumbent) to serve all buyers.
Let the unit prices offered by the two firms to buyer i be pik ∈ [0, 1], k =
I,E. A buyer’s consumer surplus is given by consumption value minus total
expenditure, defined as:
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(1) CSi
(
pik, Qk
)
=
{ (
1− pik
)
si if Qk ≥ s¯
−piksi otherwise
Since all buyers have the same willingness-to-pay, p¯ = 1, even a monopolist
who could price discriminate would optimally set a uniform price pmi = 1. Thus,
discriminatory pricing can arise only as a result of strategic interaction.
The game: Play occurs in the following sequence: At time t = 0, the incumbent
and the entrant simultaneously announce their prices, which will be binding
at t = 1. At time t = 1, each of the m buyers decides whether to patronize
the incumbent or the entrant. We also assume that offers are observable to
everyone.
As for the prices that firms can offer in t = 0, we focus on the two extreme
cases of uniform pricing and first degree price discrimination. We then briefly
discuss other forms of price discrimination, such as implicit price discrimination
(generalized discounts) and coupons.
III. EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS
In line with Segal and Whinston [2000], who also analyze a model with scale
effects and multiple buyers, we find that two types of pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria emerge in our game: an exclusionary (miscoordination) equilibrium where
all buyers buy from the incumbent, and an entry equilibrium where all buyers
buy from the entrant.11
We first state a general exclusion result which holds for any pricing regime
(Section III(i)). Then, we study the role of miscoordination in sustaining such
exclusionary equilibria, and how they are eliminated through buyer coordina-
tion. The following subsection analyzes entry equilibria under different pricing
regimes (Section III(ii)). We then discuss other forms of price discrimination,
and illustrate our findings with a simple example.
III(i). Exclusionary equilibria
Proposition 1. (Exclusionary equilibria) There always exist pure-strategy Nash
equilibria where I serves all buyers. In such an equilibrium, I sets p˜iI ∈ [0, 1] for
all i = 1, . . . ,m, where
∑
i
sip˜
i
I ≥ cI , E sets some p˜
i
E ∈ [0, 1] such that p˜
i
E ≤ p˜
i
I
for all i = 1, . . . ,m, and in all continuation equilibria where p˜iE ≤ p˜
i
I , all buyers
buy from I.
Proof: See Appendix.
The equilibria identified in Proposition 1 are all socially inefficient because the
entrant could provide a good equivalent to the incumbent’s at a lower cost
(recall that the entrant can reach the minimum threshold size if it sells to all
new buyers). Moreover, the incumbent will earn positive profits in some of
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these exclusionary equilibria. In fact, any incumbent profit from zero to the full
monopoly rent can be sustained.
To understand Proposition 1, note that even if piE ≤ p
i
I for all i, no buyer
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from I to E; with all other buyers
buying from I, the entrant’s network would be below the critical size (recall
that no single buyer is sufficient for E to reach the minimum size), so that the
entrant’s good has zero value to such a deviating buyer. As long as buyers
cannot coordinate on switching from I to E, I will continue to serve the entire
market alone even if E offers much more attractive prices.
Continuation equilibria play a crucial role for the equilibrium at the firms’
decision stage. Consider the candidate exclusionary equilibrium where piE =
piI = 1 for all i and all buyers buy from the incumbent. This equilibrium is
sustained by having that when piE ≤ p
i
I , the chosen continuation equilibria are
those where all buyers will buy from the incumbent.12 (As we shall see later,
when piE ≤ p
i
I there are also continuation equilibria where all buyers buy from
the entrant). Otherwise, a deviation by the entrant could attract all the buyers,
undermining the candidate equilibrium.
The example above represents an extreme case, in the sense that the un-
derlying continuation equilibrium is the most favorable one for firm I. This
equilibrium is by no means the only exclusionary equilibrium that can arise in
our game. For instance, there are other equilibria where all buyers miscoordinate
on the incumbent, but the latter can at most charge some price p˜iI < p
m
I = 1
to some or all i. Such an equilibrium is sustained by continuation equilibria
where buyers buy from I as long as piE ≤ p
i
I ≤ p˜
i
I , but would switch to E if p
i
I
exceeded p˜iI . Thus, the structure of the continuation equilibria determines the
level of equilibrium prices, which in turn determine the incumbent’s equilibrium
payoffs.
Finally, note that such exclusionary equilibria exist for any pricing regime,
no matter if discriminatory or not.13 The possibility of price discrimination
only extends the range of sustainable prices and hence the range of possible
rent distributions across buyers; in particular, some buyers may even be offered
below-cost prices, piI < cI , which cannot happen under uniform pricing, where
the lower bound on equilibrium prices is of course cI . The driving force behind
these equilibria is just that a unilateral deviation by a buyer - given that all
others buy from the incumbent - is not sufficient to give the entrant the threshold
size it needs.
If instead buyers can coordinate their supplier choice, the joint deviation of
a group of buyers sufficiently large to generate critical mass for the entrant can
disrupt any exclusionary equilibrium. In other words, if we apply the concept
of coalition proofness14 to the equilibria identified in Proposition 1, we find that
all of these equilibria are eliminated.
Proposition 2. The exclusionary equilibria identified in Proposition 1 are not
coalition proof.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Intuitively, the exclusionary equilibria described in Proposition 1 all rely on
buyers’ miscoordination. If buyers could coordinate their choices, or equivalently
if there existed only one buyer, these equilibria would no longer exist.
III(ii). Entry equilibria
In this Section, we look for those equilibria where the entrant serves all buyers.
It turns out that these equilibria may not always exist, as their existence depends
on the price regimes assumed. More precisely, Proposition 3 shows that entry
equilibria always exist under uniform pricing, but they only exist for a subset
of the total parameter space under first-degree price discrimination.
Proposition 3. (i) Under uniform pricing, an entry equilibrium in pure and
undominated strategies exists for any cE < cI ; it is characterized by: p˜iE =
p˜iI = cI for all i, and all buyers buy from E whenever pE ≤ pI .
(ii) Under first-degree price discrimination, a pure strategy entry equilibrium
only exists for cE ≤ c˜I where c˜I ≪ cI ; when it exists, all buyers buy from E
whenever piE ≤ p
i
I for all i, and p˜
i
E = p˜
i
I ≤ cI for all i, with p˜
i
E = p˜
i
I < cI for at
least one i.
Proof: See Appendix.
Let us first consider the simpler case (i) where suppliers are constrained to
charge the same price to every buyer, i.e. pik ≤ pk∀i, k = I,E. We have seen
in Section III(i) that when pE ≤ pI , there is an exclusionary equilibrium where
all buyers buy from the incumbent. However, there is also an equilibrium at
the supplier choice stage where all buyers buy from the entrant: The entrant
reaches the critical size for sure, and no buyer has an incentive to deviate given
that all others buy from the entrant, since it would pay a (weakly) higher price
pI for a product which is as good as the entrant’s.
At the price setting stage of the game, the set of equilibria coincides with
that of the Bertrand game with asymmetric costs: Any pE ∈ (cE, cI ] can arise
in equilibrium, provided I charges the same price as E so as to rule out an
upward deviation by E. But as usual, pE = cI is the only price supported by
an equilibrium in undominated strategies. This equilibrium always exists, no
matter how small the efficiency gap between E and I is, as long as cE < cI .15
Let us now turn to the case (ii) of first-degree price discrimination, i.e. the
case where each firm can set a different price for each buyer. Unlike the uni-
form pricing case, entry equilibria do not necessarily exist when firms can price
discriminate. To fix ideas, suppose that there are only two buyers, and start
with the candidate entry equilibrium where both firms charge cI and all buyers
buy from the entrant (a natural candidate, as this was an entry equilibrium
under uniform pricing). This equilibrium can be disrupted by the incumbent
setting a price cI − ǫ to buyer 1 (so as to deprive E of the critical size) and the
monopoly price to the remaining buyer (buyer 2 on its own is not sufficient for
E). Thus, the loss made on buyer 1 would be outweighed by the profits made
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on buyer 2. Indeed, under this deviation buyer 1 strictly prefers to buy from I,
thus preventing the entrant from reaching the minimum size. Anticipating that
for buyer 1 it is a dominant strategy to buy from the incumbent, buyer 2 will
also prefer to buy from I rather than from the entrant, since it would derive
zero utility from buying from E.
Suppose that to shield itself from this possible deviation, E sets a price
which matches I’s best offer to buyer 1, while continuing to charge cI to buyer
2. Such a price profile cannot sustain an entry equilibrium either, because I
could deviate again, by attracting buyer 2 with a price below cI , while charging
the monopoly price to buyer 1. Therefore, an entry equilibrium can exist only
if it is immune to all the possible deviations. With two buyers, this means that
both will pay a price strictly below cI in equilibrium.
For the general case where m ≥ 2, there are more than two coalitions (and
possibly very many) which I can target to prevent the entrant from attaining
the critical size. Their number and composition will then depend on the exact
value of s¯ and the size distribution of the buyers. For an entry equilibrium
to exist for a general m ≥ 2, E’s equilibrium prices must be immune against
deviations by all these possible coalitions.
To explore the boundaries of the parameter space where such equilibrium
price vectors exist, we have to study the case which is most favorable to the
entrant. This will be the case where the threshold value is very low (any two
buyers are sufficient to reach s¯), so that the incumbent will have to steal all but
one buyer to prevent entry (i.e. coalitions must have at least m− 1 buyers to
break an entry equilibrium). This means that only one buyer will be left to be
‘exploited’ (i.e. who can be charged the monopoly price) under such a deviation,
which is the minimum needed for I to offer below-cost prices to (some or all)
the other buyers.
As we show in the Proof of Proposition 3, the candidate entry equilibrium
prices which satisfy this condition can be characterized as
pˆiE = 1−
1− cI
(m− 1) si
∀i
Note that pˆiE may exceed cI ; this will be the case for large buyers, i.e. whenever
si > 1/(m− 1). In this case, the relevant upper bound for the equilibrium price
offer by the entrant is of course cI , as any pˆiE > cI would immediately trigger
undercutting by the incumbent on that particular buyer i. Therefore, the most
general statement we can make about pricing patterns in entry equilibria with
m > 2 buyers is that some buyers (at least one buyer), but not necessarily all
buyers, will pay a price strictly below cI , while some buyers (but not all) might
pay exactly cI .
Given that the average price paid in any entry equilibrium will be below cI ,
this means that the entrant’s profits will be lower than cI −cE. As we allow the
minimum size to increase (so that E needs more and more buyers to reach s¯),
the ratio of ‘targeted’ to ‘exploitable’ buyers will change in favor of I, allowing
I to make more and more aggressive price offers to any subgroup of buyers.
8
Then, equilibrium prices will fall below the upper bound identified by the most
favorable case. In other words, E can no longer extract the total efficiency
rent cI − cE which it could appropriate under uniform pricing. Thus, for some
parameters, namely cE close to cI , no entry equilibrium can be sustained under
first-degree price discrimination where such equilibria would exist under uniform
pricing.
Section III(iv) provides a simple example that characterizes entry equilibria
under price discrimination. It will illustrate how the higher the efficiency gap
(cI − cE) the more likely entry equilibria will exist, and that at such equilibria
prices are below cI .
In parallel to our treatment of exclusionary equilibria, let us study whether
the entry equilibria identified in Proposition 3 are coalition-proof.
Proposition 4. The entry equilibria identified in Proposition 3 are all coalition
proof.
Proof: See Appendix.
This Proposition states that coalition-proofness does not eliminate any of the
entry equilibria identified in Proposition 3.16
III(iii). Other forms of price discrimination
The case of first-degree price discrimination analyzed so far is a useful bench-
mark once we depart from a framework of uniform pricing. Of course, there are
many other discriminatory schemes apart from first-degree price discrimination,
each having different exclusionary effects, depending on how precisely they allow
the incumbent to target individual buyers and/or orders to prevent the entrant
from reaching the critical network size. Let us briefly discuss two such schemes
which are of practical relevance:
(i) Implicit price discrimination (standardized rebates, or quantity discounts)
If firms cannot perfectly discriminate among buyers, they may resort to non-
linear pricing to screen buyers by the quantities they buy. In this case, a buyer
may want to order more or less than si to conceal its true type. To accommodate
the case where buyer i acquires some quantity qi > si (where qi is the quantity
acquired by buyer i, and si is the maximum quantity i can consume), we have to
allow for free disposal of excess units, i.e. a buyer who did not consume all the
units it bought can dispose of the rest at no cost. We know from contract theory
that one or more types of agents (i.e. buyers) will receive information rents if
the price menu is to achieve self-sorting. Moreover, such self-sorting may even
fail altogether, so that two or more types will bunch in the same contract. This
makes quantity discounts a weaker instrument in targeting individual buyers
compared to first-degree price discrimination. While the incumbent may still
be able to break entry equilibria with quantity discounts, this can only occur in
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a subset of the parameter space where entry equilibria are broken under first-
degree price discrimination. The example given in the next section will illustrate
how first- and second-degree price discrimination differ in their exclusionary
effects.17
(ii) Coupons
Firms may also want to set different prices for each unit they sell, even on units
sold to the same buyer. This form of price discrimination can be achieved,
for instance, through the use of coupons: suppose each coupon entitles the
buyer who redeems it to a price reduction on one unit; then, the incumbent
could issue an amount of coupons that is just sufficient to deprive the entrant
of the critical size, and recover the losses made on these units by selling the
remaining units at a monopoly price of 1. One may think that this form of price
discrimination is perhaps more effective than first-degree price discrimination
because the incumbent can reduce the quantity sold at a discount price to the
necessary minimum of inf {1− s¯+ ǫ| ǫ > 0} = 1− s¯.
However, we will argue that such coupons are never more exclusionary (and
sometimes less exclusionary) than first-degree price discrimination. Suppose the
incumbent issues coupons which entitle the holders of these coupons to purchase
a given quantity of the good at a discounted price pdI < pE (where pE is the
candidate entry equilibrium price). Assume that the coupons are not allocated
randomly (i.e. the incumbent can target its coupons towards specific buyers).
Let the total quantity available at the discounted price be 1− s¯, i.e. such that
the residual demand for E will fall below the minimum threshold if all buyers
redeem their coupons. Suppose that all but one buyer bought all the discounted
units they were offered by I. Will the last buyer also redeem all his coupons?
The last buyer understands that by purchasing all the remaining units from
I, the entrant will not reach the critical mass of sales, so that the entrant’s
good has zero valuation to the buyer, while selling at a positive price. Buyer
i then anticipates that he will have to purchase his remaining requirements
from I at monopoly price 1. In other words, with qi denoting the quantity
offered to buyer i at the discounted price pdI , buyer i’s total expenditure would
then be qipdI + (si − qi) 1. Then, buyer i would be better off buying just qi − ǫ
from I, and buying the rest, namely si − qi + ǫ, from E.18 E would then
attract just enough demand to reach the threshold size, and i’s expenditure
would be reduced to (qi − ǫ) pdI +(si − qi + ǫ) pE. Thus, buyer i will undermine
the incumbent’s exclusionary strategy, preventing I from gaining the patronage
needed to deprive E of the minimum size.
The only way for I to induce buyer i to buy a sufficient quantity from I (i.e.
enough for E to lose critical mass) is by extending the discount price to all of
i’s demand, i.e. setting qi = si. But this pricing strategy coincides with that of
first-degree price discrimination, where each buyer is offered one flat price for
all his requirements. In this sense, coupons cannot be more exclusionary than
first-degree price discrimination.
10
If, in addition, we relax the assumption that I can perfectly target the
coupons towards individual buyers, coupons will be even less effective than
first-degree price discrimination. Recall that we ruled out side-payments or any
other transactions among buyers. Thus, if one buyer happens to receive coupons
for a quantity q in excess of this buyers demand, q > si, some of the coupons
issued will simply remain unused, because buyer i cannot pass them on to some
buyer j who received q < sj . Whenever there is a chance that coupons end up
in the wrong hands, the incumbent may end up selling less than the necessary
1 − s¯ units. Then, some entry equilibria may survive which could be broken
under first-degree price discrimination (or with perfectly targeted coupons).
III(iv). An example
In this Section, we consider a simple example to illustrate how price discrimi-
nation may prevent entry equilibria from existing, and to compare the results
under explicit and implicit price discrimination.
Throughout this Section, we keep the same assumptions as in the general
model, but we restrict attention to the case where s1 = s2 = k/2 and s3 = 1−k,
with k > 1 − k > k/2. In other words, there are two small buyers whose
individual demand is lower than the large buyer’s, but whose total demand is
higher than hers. (Note that this implies that 1/2 < k < 2/3.) We also assume
that k < s¯ < 1 − k/2. The first inequality says that selling only to the small
buyers - and a fortiori only to the large buyer - would not allow the entrant
to reach critical size; the second inequality says that the entrant would reach
sufficient scale if it sold to the large buyer and one of the two small buyers. This
is equivalent to saying that the incumbent would need to get either the large
buyer or both small buyers to exclude the entrant: k/2 ≤ 1− s¯ ≤ 1− k.
Finally, in order to avoid the unnecessary complications of dealing with non-
negative price constraints, we restrict attention to values where cI > k (of course
we continue to assume that cE < cI).
(i) First degree (explicit) price discrimination
For an entry equilibrium to exist, we need to find a triple (pS1E , p
S2
E , p
L
E) which is
immune to deviations by the incumbent. Since the incumbent could block entry
either (i) by selling to both small buyers through prices pSiI < p
Si
E , for i = 1, 2
(while serving the large buyer at monopoly price pM = 1), or (ii) by selling
to the large buyer at a price pLI < p
L
E (while recouping losses by serving the
small buyers at the monopoly price pM = 1), at an entry equilibrium all of the
entrant’s prices must be such that no profitable undercutting by the incumbent
could take place.
Let us analyze this problem formally. Under the possible deviations (i) and
(ii) the incumbent’s offers must satisfy πI ≥ 0:
(i) kpSI + 1− k ≥ cI ,
(ii) (1− k)pLI + k ≥ cI ,
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where pSI denotes the average price paid to the small buyers, i.e. p
S
I =
1
2p
S1
I +
1
2p
S2
I . The incumbent’s most aggressive price offers would therefore be
respectively:
pS(expl)
I
= cI−(1−k)
k
;pL(expl)
I
= cI−k1−k ,
For an entry equilibrium to exist, the entrant must set prices which are
immune to deviations, namely pSiE ≤ p
S
I
, and pLE ≤ p
L
I
; profit maximization for
E requires strict equalities for these prices. Therefore, an entry equilibrium will
exist if and only if πE(pSI , p
S
I
, pL
I
) = pS
I
k+ pL
I
(1− k)− cE ≥ 0. By substitution,
an entry equilibrium exists if and only if πE(pSI , p
S
I
, pL
I
) = 2cI − 1 − cE ≥ 0,
which leads to the following result.
Remark 1. (Explicit discrimination) An entry equilibrium in pure strategies
exists if and only if cE ≤ 2cI − 1. At such an equilibrium, firms E and I set
prices (pS1, pS2, pL) =
(
cI−(1−k)
k
< cI ,
cI−(1−k)
k
< cI ,
cI−k
1−k < cI
)
and all three
buyers buy from E.
(ii) Implicit (2nd degree) price discrimination
Suppose now that the firms are not able to target specific buyers, but have to
rely on 2nd degree discrimination. In order to find the entry equilibrium prices,
we have to follow the same logic as in the previous case, but in addition, we
have to require that price offers satisfy a self-selection constraints. Consider
for instance the incumbent’s possible deviation where it sets the low price pL
I
to attract the large buyer, while charging pM = 1 to the small buyers. The
incumbent can make such an offer only if it satisfies the small buyers’ incentive
constraint (IC), i.e. if the latter do not prefer to buy (1−k) units (of which they
would use only k/2 units) at the price pL
I
rather than k/2 units at the monopoly
price 1. Likewise for the case where the deviation targets the small buyers: such
an offer must guarantee that the large buyer does not prefer to buy fewer units
at the low price pS
I
intended for small buyers rather than (1 − k) units at the
monopoly price.19 Note that both firms have to set the same price for both
small buyers, since prices can only condition on quantity sold here, which is of
course the same for both small buyers.
Formally, therefore, the incumbent’s offers must satisfy:
(i′) kpS
I
+ (1− k)pLI ≥ cI , s.to: (1− k)
(
1− pLI
)
≥
k
2
(
1− pS
I
)
; pLI ≤ 1
(ii′) (1− k)pL
I
+ kpSI ≥ cI , s.to:
k
2
(
1− pSI
)
≥
k
2
− (1− k)pL
I
; pSI ≤ 1.
Consider first (i’). It is straightforward to see that pLI = 1 will never satisfy
the IC of the large buyer (she would get zero surplus and would be better off
pretending to be a small buyer). Therefore, the highest price that the incumbent
can charge to the large buyer in a deviation would be:20
12
pLI = 1−
1− pS
I
1− k
k
2
.
By substituting into (i′) and solving we obtain the lowest price the incumbent
could offer to small buyers:
pS(impl)
I
= 1−
2(1− cI)
3k
> pS(expl)
I
.
Next, we need to consider (ii’). One can check that the prices pL
I
= cI−k1−k ,
pSI = 1 (i.e. the prices which apply under explicit discrimination) satisfy the IC
of the small buyers as long as cI ≥ 3k/2. Else, the IC would not be satisfied,
and the price intended for the small buyers must be reduced. By solving the IC
with equality, one obtains:
pSI =
2(1− k)
k
pL
I
.
By substituting into (ii’) and solving one obtains the best possible offer the
incumbent can make to the large buyer:
pL(impl)
I
= 1−
cI
3(1− k)
> pL(expl)
I
.
Clearly, the incumbent’s offers in a deviation are (weakly) less aggressive
under implicit than under explicit discrimination.
The final step is to check whether (i) the entrant can profitably set prices
which are immune to deviations, and (ii) whether the candidate equilibrium
prices are themselves incentive-compatible.
(i) The entrant breaks even under the candidate equilibrium prices if πE(pSI , p
S
I
, pL
I
) =
pS
I
k+pL
I
(1−k)− cE ≥ 0. Note that for the case of implicit price discrimination
we have to consider two intervals:
• cI ≥ 3k/2. In this case, p
S(impl)
I = 1 −
2(1−cI)
3k and p
L
I
= cI−k1−k . By
substitution, πE(p
S(impl
I , p
S
I
, pL
I
) = 5cI−23 − cE ≥ 0.
• cI < 3k/2. In this case, p
S(impl)
I = 1 −
2(1−cI)
3k and p
L
I
= cI3(1−k) . By
substitution, πE(p
S(impl
I , p
S
I
, pL
I
) = cI + k −
2
3 − cE ≥ 0.
(ii) It is easily verified that both candidate price pairs
(
p
S(impl)
I , p
L
I
)
always
satisfy the ICs: By construction of pL
I
, the small buyers prefer to buy quantity
k/2 at price pSI = 1 rather than 1− k at price p
L
I
, implying that they will also
prefer k/2 at pS(impl)I < 1 over 1− k at price p
L
I
; Analogously, by construction
of pS
I
, the large buyer prefers to buy quantity 1−k at price pLI > p
L
I
over buying
k/2 at price pS(impl)I , implying that it will also prefer 1 − k at the respective
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pL
I
over k/2 at price pS(impl)I . Also note that our parameter restrictions imply
p
S(impl)
I > p
L
I
for both candidate price pairs
(
p
S(impl)
I , p
L
I
)
; in other words,
the equilibrium unit price is decreasing in quantity (as we would expect for a
well-behaved quantity discount scheme).
These results can be summarized thus:
Remark 2. (Implicit discrimination) An entry equilibrium in pure strategies
exists:
(i) For cI ≥ 3k/2, if and only if cE ≤ (5cI − 2)/3. At such an equilibrium,
firms E and I set prices
(
1− 2(1−cI)3k < cI , 1−
2(1−cI)
3k < cI ,
cI−k
1−k < cI
)
and all
three buyers buy from E.
(ii) For cI < 3k/2, if and only if cE ≤ cI + k− 2/3. At such an equilibrium,
firms E and I set prices
(
1− 2(1−cI)3k < cI , 1−
2(1−cI)
3k < cI ,
cI
3(1−k) < cI
)
and
all three buyers buy from E.
Comparison: It is straightforward to check that entry occurs over a larger set of
parameters under implicit than under explicit price discrimination. Obviously,
this follows directly from the fact that under implicit discrimination the entrant’s
prices which are immune to the incumbent’s deviation are higher.
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, AND POLICY ISSUES
In this Section, first (Section IV(i)) we take stock of the results obtained, in
particular by comparing the price regimes we have studied so far; and then
(Section IV(ii)) we discuss the possible policy implications that arise from these
results.
IV(i). Comparing price regimes
The main point of our paper is that when there are network effects, an incumbent
with an established customer base can outcompete a more efficient entrant by
price discriminating, even if the entrant can resort to price discrimination as well
and moves at the same time as the incumbent. The exclusionary mechanism
at work relies on the fact that the incumbent can target certain subgroups of
consumers with low prices so that sufficient scale is denied to the entrant.
The previous Section shows formally that when firms can price-discriminate,
entry equilibria will only exist in a subset of the parameter space (more precisely,
when the efficiency gap between the incumbent and the entrant is sufficiently
large), whereas they would always exist under uniform pricing. If one looks
only at the set of the possible Nash equilibria, one would conclude that under
price discrimination there exists a range of parameters for which only a mis-
coordination equilibrium would exist. If one prefers to rely on the refinement
of Coalition-proof Nash equilibria, under price discrimination there would be a
region in which no pure strategy coalition-proof Nash equilibrium exists.
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The reader may wonder what kind of equilibrium can be sustained in such a
region. If no pure strategy profile is immune to deviations by either incumbent
or entrant, such an equilibrium will have to be in mixed strategies. While we
do not fully characterize these mixed strategy equilibria here, we want to point
out that in any such equilibrium, there is a strictly positive probability that the
entrant will not serve the buyers. To see why, consider a very simple example
with only two buyers, having demands s1 and s2. Note that any price pair(
pˆ1E, pˆ
2
E
)
in the support of the entrant’s equilibrium mixed strategy must allow
the entrant to break even: pˆ1Es1 + pˆ
2
Es2 ≥ cE. (Otherwise, the entrant could
increase its expected profits by shifting probability mass away from such price
pairs that yield negative profits.) If no pure-strategy entry equilibrium exists,
then at least one of the two prices is above the lowest price that the incumbent
could offer to that same buyer: e.g. pˆ1E > p˜
1
I where p˜
1
I solves p˜
1
Is1 + 1 · s2 = cI .
Therefore, it must be a best reply for the incumbent in any such mixed strategy
equilibrium to give positive probability to price pairs
(
pˆ1I , 1
)
where pˆ1I ∈
[
p˜1I , pˆ
1
E
]
:
In the event that the entrant plays
(
pˆ1E, pˆ
2
E
)
, the incumbent would outcompete
E on buyer 1, and therefore also win buyer 2’s orders, thus serving the entire
market and making strictly positive profits.
Since the entrant produces at lower costs than the incumbent, consumers
have inelastic demands, and both networks give the same utility to buyers, entry
is always socially efficient in our model. By reducing the region in which entry
equilibria can be sustained, price discrimination - whether explicit, implicit, or
relying on price coupons - is welfare detrimental in our model.
Beyond this simple conclusion, a deeper comparison between the pricing
regimes may be worth discussing. In particular, one may want to evaluate the
welfare properties of the regimes in regions where the entry equilibrium exists
under both uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing. In terms of our model,
total surplus under the two regimes in regions where entry takes place is iden-
tical. However, under price discrimination equilibrium prices are lower than
under uniform pricing, pointing to a possible trade-off between lower prices and
achievable entry. If competition authorities gave more weight to consumer sur-
plus than to total surplus in their objective function, then the policy implications
of the paper might be more ambiguous.
Nevertheless, the fact that under price discrimination prices in an entry equi-
librium (if it exists) are lower, may have some additional adverse consequences
on entry, as they may discourage cost-reducing investment opportunities, as we
discuss next.21
The (possible) investment effects of price discrimination:
Consider a variant of our model where the first stage (price choices) of the
game is preceded by a stage where the entrant has to decide whether to carry
out a cost-reducing investment or not. Absent the investment opportunity, the
entrant has the same marginal cost cI as the incumbent; by investing an amount
f it would instead achieve a marginal cost cE = cI − x, with x ∈ (0, cI) and
f < x (which guarantees that the investment is socially efficient). To fix ideas,
consider the specific example of Section III(iv) (but the same qualitative results
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hold in the general model). Given the investment decisions, the results of the
pricing games are unchanged (f is a sunk cost).
Under uniform pricing, the entry equilibrium exists - given investment de-
cisions - if πE = cI − (cI − x) ≥ 0, which always holds. Under explicit
discrimination, the entry equilibrium exists - given investment decisions - if
πE = 2cI − 1− (cI − x) ≥ 0, or x ≥ 1− cI .
Let us now look at the first stage of the game. Under uniform pricing, the
investment (and therefore entry) will take place if and only if π̂E = x− f ≥ 0,
which always holds. Under explicit discrimination, instead, the investment will
take place if and only if π̂E = cI − 1 + x− f ≥ 0, or x ≥ 1− cI + f .
In other words, there are two effects which may negatively affect entry under
explicit discrimination. One is the effect of the exclusionary mechanism at the
heart of this paper; another one is that the expectation of lower equilibrium
prices may further discourage efficient cost-reducing opportunities.
Note, however, that this effect may disappear if investment levels are en-
dogenous and the price regimes do not change the marginal profits from the
investments (rather than the absolute levels of profits as in the previous ex-
ample with exogenous investment levels). Suppose that the entrant can choose
its investment level x, at a fixed (but endogenous) sunk cost x2/2. As before,
assume that the entrant’s cost are given by cI − x.
At the second stage of the game, the conditions for an entry equilibrium -
given investment decisions x - are the same as above: Under uniform pricing,
entry exists if πuE = x ≥ 0, which always holds. Under explicit discrimination,
entry exists if πdE = cI − 1 + x ≥ 0. Note, however, that the marginal benefit
from a unit of investment is precisely the same under the two regimes. Indeed,
in the first stage of the game, investment levels are chosen respectively so as
to maxx π̂
u
E = x − x
2/2 and maxx π̂
d
E = cI − 1 + x − x
2/2. In both cases, the
optimal investment will be x∗ = 1, implying that there is no further investment
distortion created by discriminatory pricing.
IV(ii). Policy implications
We have seen that price discrimination (whatever the actual form it takes) re-
duces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria. Before drawing
policy implications, though, we should bear in mind the context of our analy-
sis. We analyze an industry where there is a dominant incumbent (when the
entrant makes its offers, all ‘old ’ buyers are using the incumbent’s network, so
the incumbent’s market share at the start of the game is 100%). Our policy
conclusions cannot be generalized to situations where there is little asymmetry
between competing suppliers. Rather than offering comments on the possible
benefits of blanket prohibitions on price discrimination for all firms, we should
therefore limit ourselves to discuss possible restrictions to the conduct of domi-
nant firms.
In this perspective, there are two natural antitrust policy rules that one
should consider. The first is that a dominant firm may not price discriminate.
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The second is that a dominant firm may not sell at prices which are below
marginal costs.
(i) Prohibiting a dominant firm from discriminating
As to the first rule, note that it should be applied to any form of price dis-
crimination by the incumbent. Indeed, we have showed in Section III(iv) that
even 2nd degree discrimination (which in the example amounts to quantity dis-
counts - the unit price decreases with the number of units bought) can give the
incumbent sufficient scale to deny entry. Still, as our results show, the more
targeted price discrimination the higher its exclusionary potential (that is, the
smaller the parameter space for which efficient entry can be achieved), giving
some support to the fact that courts and antitrust authorities tend to regard
individualized rebates by dominant firms with more suspicion than standardized
rebates and quantity discounts, whenever they cannot be justified on efficiency
grounds (e.g. savings on packaging and transaction costs, allowing for a larger
production run). 22
However, preventing dominant firms from price-discriminating may have
detrimental effects we cannot account for in our model, where all consumers
have the same valuation for the good. In a more general model with hetero-
geneous valuations, a firm may want to price discriminate even if it was an
unchallenged monopolist (unlike in our paper), and - as is well known - price
discrimination may well allow to reach consumers who would not otherwise buy,
and turn out to be welfare beneficial. Accordingly, a policy rule aimed at pro-
hibiting dominant firms from price discriminating may well have undesirable
properties that admittedly we cannot fully evaluate within our model.
(ii) Prohibiting a dominant firm’s below-cost prices
We would be more confident in supporting the second policy rule above, namely
to prohibit a dominant firm from below-cost pricing (unless the standard pro-
competitive justifications for below-cost pricing apply, as for instance in infant
markets, or in the case of complementary products or two-sided markets). Such
a rule would effectively eliminate the scope for the exclusionary mechanism high-
lighted in the paper: the incumbent can outcompete a more efficient rival only
if it can price a certain threshold number of units below cost - while recouping
losses made on such units by setting a high price on the remaining ones. If it
could not sell below cost, it would therefore not be able to obtain orders at the
expenses of a more efficient rival.
Note also that this policy rule does not coincide with a rule requiring the
dominant firm not to make overall losses, but with one requiring it not to make
losses on any (non-trivial) subset of the market. Indeed, as we have showed,
the incumbent needs to sell only a certain threshold number of units to block
entry; units beyond this threshold can be sold at monopoly prices, thereby giving
overall positive profits. Proof that the incumbent is achieving positive profits
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in the market should accordingly not be accepted as evidence that there is no
anticompetitive conduct.
This rule is in the spirit of sacrifice tests of anticompetitive effects, that are
based on the analysis of the cost (the ‘sacrifice’) incurred by the dominant firm
in order to implement the challenged conduct. In particular, it is consistent with
the ‘no economic sense’ test, which consists of verifying whether the only reason
why the defendant entails a sacrifice implementing the challenged strategy is
to reduce competition. Note also that the ‘no economic sense’ test ‘does not
require a showing of that there is a period of time in which the defendant’s profit
are lower than they were before the exclusionary conduct was undertaken. The
reduction in profits can be conceptual rather than temporal.’ (Salop [2006]: 320)
A dominant firm which sells below cost to some buyers while simultaneously
recouping on other buyers would therefore be found positive under this test.
(iii) Interoperability
Another key feature of our model is the presence of network externalities and
the assumption of incompatible networks, i.e. that the incumbent’s pre-existing
customer base does not exert any positive externality to the users of the entrant’s
network. A policy rule requiring interoperability between the incumbent’s and
the entrant’s network would therefore solve the buyers’ coordination problem
at the root, and entry equilibria would always exist. Even less than perfect
interoperability would work in the same direction by allowing buyers of the
entrant to enjoy some of the network effects of the incumbent, and would enlarge
the set of achievable entry equilibria.
Obviously, interoperability obligations may also have detrimental effects. For
instance, they might conflict with intellectual property rights and accordingly
have an ex ante disincentive effect. Further, in some cases they may discourage
variety and innovations, as the entrant might find it more convenient to con-
form to the specifications of the incumbent’s network rather than developing
original but incompatible features. A complete discussion of the pros and cons
of imposing compatibility is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but our
paper does suggest that when there exist strong asymmetries among an incum-
bent and entrants, interoperability obligations may be a way to avoid that those
imbalances could have long term consequences (think for instance of imposing
roaming obligations to telecom incumbents until new entrants have developed
their own network).
(iv) Buyer power
Finally, our model crucially depends on some fragmentation of buyers: no buyer
can command a sufficiently large number of orders to give the entrant’s network a
viable size. Clearly, the miscoordination problems - and accordingly the possible
exclusionary effects - which are at the heart of our paper would be absent if there
was sufficient buyer concentration. In terms of our model, it would be sufficient
for sm > s for exclusionary equilibria not to arise.
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Furthermore, if buyers are fragmented (i.e., sm < s) but they can take
joint decisions, miscoordination would not take place. Accordingly, agreements
among buyers to establish a central purchasing agency, or to delegate their
purchase decisions to an entity which sets up a common public procurement
system, or any other device which allows to take joint decisions, would have
procompetitive effects in industries such as the one described in this paper.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper demonstrates the exclusionary potential of price discrimination and
rebates in a model where - relative to the literature on exclusionary practices
- the entrant is in a fairly good initial position: it is more efficient than the
incumbent, it does not have to pay any set-up cost, it can approach buyers
at the same time as the incumbent, and it can use the same pricing schemes.
However, the incumbent does enjoy an incumbency advantage (when the game
starts, its network has already reached the minimum threshold size to be viable,
whereas the entrant’s has not), and this turns out to be crucial.
We have showed that - if buyers are sufficiently fragmented and/or the
threshold size is sufficiently high - both exclusionary equilibria and entry equi-
libria exist under uniform pricing, and that any form of price discrimination
reduces the set of achievable (socially efficient) entry equilibria: while discrim-
ination does not prevent miscoordination, it makes it easier for the incumbent
to disrupt entry equilibria. This is done by a ‘divide and rule’ strategy where
some buyers are offered a below-cost price, thereby depriving the entrant of
the critical mass it needs, and allowing the incumbent to recover losses from
the remaining buyers, who become captive to it. This suggests that there may
be a rationale behind judges’ findings that various forms of rebates and price
discrimination may raise anticompetitive concerns.23
We have also showed that the more targeted the discounts the higher the
potential for exclusion of the entrant, thereby lending some support to the view
that individualised rebates should be treated with more caution than standard-
ised rebates.
The possibility of exclusionary outcomes is intimately linked to the assump-
tion that there is a very strong asymmetry between the customer base of the
dominant incumbent and that of smaller and new rivals.24 For this reason, the
mechanism identified in our paper seems well suited to industries where entrants
can challenge an incumbent firm only after the latter has developed a strong
customer base; examples include industries that were recently liberalized or in-
dustries where a firm’s dominant position is built upon intellectual property
rights whose protection is about to expire.25 In such industries, our model sug-
gests that the dominant firm should be prohibited from selling below cost, and
that interoperability obligations should be considered very seriously.
APPENDIX
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Proof of Proposition 1 (Exclusionary equilibria): Consider the candidate equi-
librium where piI = p
i
E = 1∀i and all buyers buy from I. Recall that s¯ > sm ≥
. . . ≥ s1: none of the individual buyers alone is sufficient for E to reach the
minimum size. Thus, no buyer i = 1, . . . ,m will want to deviate and buy from
E, even if piE = 0, as E’s product would have zero value for the deviating buyer.
Firm I has no incentive to increase or decrease its price as it is getting the
monopoly profits. Since in all continuation equilibria buyers will not switch to
E no matter how low piE is, E has no incentive to decrease its price either.
More generally, there exists a continuum of exclusionary equilibria with price
vectors
(
p˜1k, . . . , p˜
m
k
)
, k = I,E, p˜iI ∈ [0, 1], p˜
i
E = p˜
i
I∀i,
m∑
i=1
sip˜
i
I ≥ cI , and buyers
i = 1, . . . ,m all buying from I. To sustain any such equilibrium, construct the
appropriate continuation equilibria as follows: all buyers miscoordinate on I
as long as piE ≤ p
i
I ≤ p˜
i
I . As soon as I deviates to a p
i′
I > p˜
i
I for some i, all
buyers switch to E. The proof is analogous to the case of piI = p
i
E = 1∀i. First,
no buyer has an incentive to deviate unilaterally and buy from the entrant
as the latter would not reach size s. As long as firm I breaks even under
the equilibrium prices, it has no incentive to increase its price to pi′I if in the
continuation equilibrium where piE < p
i′
I buyers would all buy from the entrant;
firm E would have no incentive to change its prices provided in all continuation
equilibria where piE < p˜
i
I all buyers buy from the incumbent.
The incumbent’s equilibrium profits may therefore range from zero to full
monopoly profits: the former is the case for all equilibrium price vectors where
m∑
i=1
sip˜
i
I = cI , the latter is the maximum payoff corresponding to equilibrium
prices piI = 1∀i.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Coalition Proofness): Consider any candidate equilib-
rium where
(
p˜1k, . . . , p˜
m
k
)
, k = I,E, p˜iI ∈ [0, 1], p˜
i
E = p˜
i
I∀i and all buyers buy
from I. To sustain such an equilibrium, the continuation equilibria must be
such that buyers miscoordinate on I as long as piE ≤ p˜
i
I∀i. Consider the subset
of price vectors where the inequality holds strictly, i.e. piE < p
i
I∀i. Suppose the
grand coalition of buyers deviates to patronize the entrant instead: Since s¯ ≤ 1,
E would reach minimum size, i.e. QE > s¯, and so the payoffs of all members of
the buyer coalition would strictly improve:
CSi
(
piE, QE
)
= CSi
(
piE, QI |QE > s¯
)
> CSi
(
piI , QI
)
∀i
where the last inequality follows from piE < p
i
I∀i. After switching to E, given
that piE < p
i
I∀i, no individual buyer or subcoalition of the grand coalition of
buyers can improve their payoffs relative to CSi
(
piE, QE
)
by switching back to I
(either unilaterally or multilaterally). Thus, we found at least one coalition hav-
ing a self-enforcing and improving deviation from any continuation equilibrium
where piE < p
i
I for all i and all buyers buy from I.
At the price setting stage of the game, this implies that it is no longer optimal
for E to set p˜iE = p˜
i
I∀i. By undercutting I slightly on all buyers, p
i′
E = p˜
i
I − ǫ∀i,
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E can attract enough buyers to reach minimum size,
∑
i si ≥ s¯. Since I breaks
even at the candidate equilibrium prices, i.e.
m∑
i=1
sip˜
i
I ≥ cI , and since cE < cI ,
there must exist an ǫ small enough such that E makes positive profits after the
price cut: ∑
i
sip
i′
E =
m∑
i=1
sip˜
i
I − ǫ > cE
Thus, imposing coalition-proofness at the supplier choice stage of the game gives
rise to a profitable deviation by E at the price setting stage of the game. This
deviation, in turn, eliminates all exclusionary equilibria identified in Proposition
1. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Entry Equilibria): (i) With all buyers buying from E
at pE = cI , E’s total sales are 1 ≥ s¯: thus, E will reach the minimum size for
sure. Since E’s product has the same value to the buyers as I’s, and the price
is the same, no buyer has an incentive to deviate and buy from I. Firm I will
not want to deviate either: To attract buyers, it would have to set pI < cI , i.e.
sell at a loss; and increasing pI above cI will not attract any buyers under the
appropriate continuation equilibria. Firm E has no incentive to change its price
either: increasing pE would imply losing the buyers to I, and decreasing pE will
just reduce profits.
Following the same logic, it is straightforward to show that there exists a
continuum of entry equilibria with any price pjE ∈ [cE, cI ] and buyers j = s, l all
buying from E, sustained by the appropriate continuation equilibria. In those
equilibria where pE = pI < cI , the incumbent plays a dominated strategy;
to sustain such an equilibrium, we must rule out the possibility that I makes
positive sales, no matter how small, as otherwise the incumbent would be making
losses; the latter is of course incompatible with equilibrium behavior because
I could always avoid those losses by setting pI = cI . Our assumption that
whenever buyers are indifferent between the two suppliers, they do not split
orders, together with the appropriate continuation equilibria where all buyers
(not just a subset) buy from E ensures that equilibria in dominated strategies
exist. However, the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies is pE = cI .
Finally, note that there can be no equilibrium where E serves all buyers at
a price pE > cI : In this case, I could profitably undercut E, and all buyers
would switch to I. Since I’s network has the required size even if none of the
new buyers buys from I, it is rational for a single buyer to unilaterally deviate
to I whenever pI < pE.
(ii) Consider a candidate equilibrium where
(
p˜1k, . . . , p˜
m
k
)
, k = I,E, p˜iE ∈ [0, cI ],
p˜iI = p˜
i
E∀i and all buyers buy from E. For this to be an equilibrium, it must
be immune to all deviations by the incumbent in which I sets piI = p˜
i
E − ε to
a subset of buyers just large enough to deprive the entrant of the critical scale,
and then charges monopoly price pjI = 1 j = i to the remaining buyers.
Depending on the exact value of s¯ and the size distribution of the buyers,
there are many different ways in which the incumbent could design such a devi-
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ation. In particular, the exact number and identity of buyers needed to prevent
entry will differ from case to case. With a very high s¯, securing just one or two
buyers may be sufficient for I to exclude E. Thus, to explore the boundaries
of the parameter space where entry equilibria exist, we have to study the most
favorable scenario for E, or equivalently, those equilibria that are hardest to
break for I. The latter are characterized by s¯ ≤ s1+ s2. This condition implies
that any two buyers (even the smallest ones) are sufficient for E to reach min-
imum size; in turn, for I to break such an entry equilibrium, it must undercut
E on at least m− 1 buyers, and can charge the monopoly price to at most one
buyer.
More specifically, denote the set of buyers by B = {1, . . . ,m}. With a total
of m buyers, and sm < s¯, any subset Ci = B\i of buyers is sufficient for I to
prevent E from reaching the threshold size. (If s¯ ≤ s1 + s2, Ci = B\i is the
smallest subset of buyers that can achieve exclusion; in general, smaller subsets
may be sufficient.) There exist m such subsets, and a necessary (though not
sufficient) condition for an entry equilibrium to exist is that none of the m
possible deviations be profitable for I (where piI = p˜
i
E − ε):
(2)

1 p2I . . . p
m
I
p1I 1 . . . p
m
I
...
. . .
...
p1I p
2
I . . . 1
×

s1
s2
...
sm
 ≤

cI
cI
...
cI

We see immediately that piE = p
i
I = cI∀i does not satisfy condition (2):
Since cI < 1, we have that 1× si +
∑
j =i
sj (cI − ǫ) >
m∑
i=1
sicI = cI for any i ∈ B.
This implies that if an entry equilibrium exists, then ∃i ∈ B : p˜iE < cI . In
fact, we can rewrite condition (2) to obtain an upper bound on the prices E can
charge in an entry equilibrium, namely:
(3)

1 p2E . . . p
m
E
p1E 1 . . . p
m
E
...
. . .
...
p1E p
2
E . . . 1
×

s1
s2
...
sm
 =

cI
cI
...
cI

Solving this system of m equations in m unknowns, we obtain:
pˆiE = 1−
1− cI
(m− 1) si
∀i
Note that two restrictions apply to pˆiE, namely (i) pˆ
i
E ≥ 0 (because we restrict
the firm’s strategy space to non-negative prices), and (ii) pˆiE ≤ cI (no buyer
can be offered a price p˜iE > cI in equilibrium, because I would immediately
undercut E on this individual buyer).
Regarding (i) pˆiE ≥ 0, note that if it is ever binding, this means that there is
at least one buyer (the smallest one, and possibly others) who is offered p˜iE = 0
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in equilibrium. Then, even if all other buyers could be charged as much as
p˜jE = cI , j = i, it is clear that E’s break even constraint has become more
stringent compared to the one under uniform pricing where p˜iE = cI∀i:
0× s1 +
∑
i>1
sicI ≥ cE
can be written as:
cE ≤ (1− s1) cI = c˜I ≪ cI
As for (ii) pˆiE ≤ cI , we have that
pˆiE ≤ cI ⇐⇒ si ≤
1
m− 1
Thus, we have to distinguish two cases:
Case 1: sm ≤ 1m−1 , so that pˆ
i
E ≤ cI∀i. Then, the upper bound on E’s
equilibrium price to buyer i is given by pˆiE. For the entrant to be able to break
even under such prices, we must have:
m∑
i=1
sipˆ
i
E ≥ cE
Inserting for pˆiE and rearranging, we obtain:
cE ≤
cIm− 1
m− 1
= c˜′I ≪ cI
Case 2: sm > 1m−1 . Then, for the largest buyer (and possibly some others)
pˆiE violates p
i
E ≤ cI , so that only the smaller buyers will be offered prices below
cI . Let the first {1, . . . , l} buyers receive general prices piE, while the remaining
{l + 1, . . . ,m} buyers are charged cI . Then, E’s prices must solve
1 p2E . . . p
l
E cI . . . cI
p1E 1 . . . p
l
E cI . . . cI
...
. . .
...
...
p1E p
2
E . . . 1 cI cI
p1E p
2
E . . . p
l
E 1 cI cI
...
... cI
. . .
...
p1E p
2
E p
l
E cI cI 1

×

s1
s2
...
sl
sl+1
...
sm

≤

cI
...
cI

The first l equations imply that
(
1− piE
)
si =
(
1− pjE
)
sj∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
The following m − l equations only differ by the identity of the buyer from
the {l + 1, . . . ,m} group who is charged the monopoly price. The highest rent
available for redistribution among the small buyers is of course generated by the
largest of these buyer; in other words, if equation m holds with equality, the
remaining inequalities from l + 1 to m − 1 are satisfied as well. Then, we can
23
solve for E’s prices as:
pˆiE = 1−
1
sil
(1− cI)
(
l∑
i=1
si + sm
)
where l is implicitly defined by the inequalities: plE ≤ cI and p
l+1
E > cI . It is
easily verified that such an l always exists; p1E < cI is implied by s1 < s1 + sm,
and l =m− 1 coincides with Case 1. Again, we have that at least 1 buyer will
pay a price strictly below cI . This will again raise the efficiency threshold for
E:
l∑
i=1
sipˆ
i
E +
m∑
i=l+1
sicI ≥ cE
reduces to
cE ≤ cI (1 + sm)− sm = c˜
′′
I ≪ cI
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4: Any Perfectly Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium must
be a subgame-perfect equilibrium and must involve coalition-proof Nash equi-
librium behavior in the continuation subgames following firm I’s offer (see Segal
and Whinston [2000], p. 299). By construction of the entry equilibria of Propo-
sition 3, they are all immune against all possible price offers by the incumbent
inducing a deviation by a sufficiently large subgroup of buyers to deprive the
entrant of the minimum size. This is equivalent to ruling out improving and
self-enforcing deviations by coalitions in the continuation subgames. To see that
the entry equilibria are subgame-perfect, just note that there is only one proper
subgame (the buyer-choice stage), and that all buyers buying from E unless any
of them has a strict incentive to deviate to I is indeed a Nash equilibrium for
any possible first-stage price offers.
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Notes
1See Kobayashi [2005] for a review of the US case law on rebates.
2 In a recent rebate case, the European Commission gave a fine of more than 1bn euro to
Intel. For a review of the EU case law on rebates, see e.g. Gyselen [2003].
3Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission, Judg-
ment of the Court of First Instance of 30 September 2003. See Motta [2009] for a detailed
discussion of this case.
4The (almost) per se illegality of exclusive contracts, rebates and discriminatory prices by
dominant firms has led to a hot debate on the EU policy towards abuse of dominance. See
Gual et al. [2006] for a contribution to the debate.
5United States vs. Microsoft Corporation, District of Columbia 1994,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ms_index_licensing.htm
6Bernheim and Whinston [1998] analyze the possible exclusionary effects of exclusive deal-
ing when firms make simultaneous offers (as in our paper), but in non-coincident markets :
first, exclusivity is offered to a buyer in a first market; afterwards, offers are made to a buyer
in a second market. In their terminology, our paper is looking at coincident market effects,
which makes our analysis closer to Aghion and Bolton [1987], Rasmusen et al. [1991], Segal
and Whinston [2000] and Fumagalli and Motta [2006]. All these papers, however, study only
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exclusive dealing arrangements and assume that the entrant can enter the market (if at all)
only after the incumbent and the buyers have negotiated an exclusive contract.
7 Innes and Sexton [1993, 1994] consider a very different contracting environment, strategic
variables, and timing of the game. In particular, after the incumbent made its offers, they allow
the buyers to contract with the entrant (or to enter themselves), so as to create countervailing
power to the incumbent’s.
8Where incompatibility could be overcome through multi-homing, Shapiro [1999] argues
that incumbents can use exclusive dealing contracts to block multi-homing, thus excluding a
technologically superior firm.
9This tie-breaking rule will be helpful when characterizing equilibrium outcomes. It can
be rationalized by introducing a tiny seller-specific transaction cost, ǫ, which the buyer would
have to pay twice if it purchased from both suppliers. Nonetheless, we do allow buyers to
split orders when it is in their interest to do so, i.e. when splitting allows them to reduce the
overall expenditure on the units they buy. One example where such splitting may arise is the
case of coupons discussed in Section III(iii).
10 It also has the advantage that the old generation of buyers can be ignored when studying
welfare effects: since we assume that they have already attained the highest level of utility,
new buyers’ decisions will never affect old buyers’ utility. Of course, this means that we cannot
formalise here the possibility that entry may hurt the old generation of buyers, but this is a
well-known effect which does not need to be emphasised again.
11Note that we rule out mixed strategies for now. We will briefly comment on them in
Section IV.
12 In this situation, the entrant is indifferent among all prices pE ≥ 0 it could charge, and
might as well offer the monopoly price, which weakly dominates all other possible equilibrium
prices.
13 In a previous version of the paper we showed that if we relaxed the assumption of non-
negative prices, then exclusionary equilibria may not exist, since the entrant could make a
single buyer deviate - by subsidizing it - even if all others bought from the incumbent.
14A coalition-proof equilibrium is such that no coalition has a self-enforcing deviation mak-
ing all its members better off; a deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further self-enforcing
and improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition of players (see Bernheim et al
[1987]).
15Moreover, when pE = pI = cI , there are also equilibria (call them ‘coexistence equilibria’)
where some buyers (in a sufficient number for the entrant to reach the critical size) buy from
the entrant and the remaining buyers buy from the incumbent. However, Proposition 3 focuses
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on the socially efficient equilibria where the inefficient incumbent does not make any sales.
(We will briefly come back to this issue at the end of this section.)
16To be more precise, recall that there are also some ‘coexistence equilibria’ where both I
and E make positive sales (though I’s sales are small enough for E to reach minimum size).
These equilibria are of course inefficient and, similar to fully exclusionary equilibria, can
only be sustained by continuation equilibria where buyers would all switch to the incumbent
whenever E tried to undercut I on the buyers served by I. Thus, they are eliminated by
coalition-proofness in quite the same way as exclusionary equilibria.
17 If both incumbent and entrant are forced to screen, as we shall assume in our example,
then not only the incumbent’s pricing will be less aggressive, but also the entrant’s ability
to respond to such aggressive offers will be restrained. It is therefore not apriori clear that
implicit discrimination makes it harder for the incumbent to break entry equilibria. However,
as our example demonstrates, the trade-off tilts in favor of the entrant.
18While we assumed that buyers will not split orders among suppliers when the latter both
offer the same price, we have not ruled out the possibility of one buyer buying from both
suppliers whenever prices differ across suppliers, as is the case here.
19Such a rebate scheme may appear as somewhat unorthodox, since buyers are ‘rewarded’
for buying little and ‘penalized’ for buying a lot. However, this is a deviation offer which will
never be made in equilibrium.
20We implicitly ruled out the possibility that the large buyer buys the small quantity k/2
twice. For certain parameter values, this mimicking strategy gives a higher surplus to the
large buyer than buying k/2 just once. In this case, the relevant incentive constraint reads
(1− k)
(
1− pL
I
)
≥ 1− k − kpS
I
. For the sake of brevity, we omit the full technical treatment
here, which is very similar to the one presented above. We are grateful to an anonymous
referee for pointing out this case.
21We are grateful to Kai-Uwe Kühn for bringing this effect to our attention.
22 see for instance European Commission [2008]’s Guidance Paper on exclusionary conduct
and cases referred therein. The European Commission and the Courts have treated indi-
vidualised rebates far more harshly than standardised rebates; the two main precedents are
Michelin I and Michelin II. See Michelin, OJ [1981] L/353/33, [1982] 1 CMLR 643 (paras.
37-42); on appeal, Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v Commission
[1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282 (paras. 71-86). And PO-Michelin, OJ [2002] L143/1,
[2002] 5 CMLR 388 (paras. 260-264); on appeal, Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission [2003]
ECR II-4071, [2004] 4 CMLR 923 (paras. 58-60).
23However, European judges in Michelin II completely overlooked efficiency defences which
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might well have justified some of the rebate schemes used by Michelin. See Motta [2009].
24Note that a crucial assumption for the exclusionary mechanism at work is that the incum-
bent has ‘old’ customers that the entrant cannot contest, due for instance to large switching
costs. If old buyers were not captive to the incumbent, it would lose its incumbency advantage
and entry would always exist. More generally, we showed in the working paper version of this
paper that the higher the incumbent’s installed base the larger the set of parameters for which
entry equilibria would not exist.
25Our model is based on scale effects on the demand side, but similar results and consider-
ations would apply to industries characterized by supply-side scale economies and in which a
dominant firm has a strong incumbency advantage.
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